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776 PEOPLE V. GORG [45 O.2~ 
[Crim. No. 5762. In Bank. Dec. 16, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ALAN KENT GORG, 
Appellant. 
[11 Criminal Law-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Appointment by 
Court.-A motion by defendant before trial in a narcotics 
case for appointment of a narcotics expert to be paid by the 
county was properly denied where defendant was out on bail 
and able to work, and where a period of more than a month 
remained before trial in which he might earn the estimated 
fee of the expert. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Appointment by Court.-
Appointment of experts under Code Civ. Proc., § 1871, rests 
in the discretion of the court, and abuse of discretion in re-
fusing to do so is not shown in a narcotics case where de-
fendant did not advise the court as to the type of expert 
required or what he might produce, and where defendant had 
full opportunity to cross-examine State's experts and pro-
duced an expert botanist of his own. 
[3] Poisons-Offenses-Possession of Narcotics-Knowledge.-In 
order to sustain a conviction of possession of narcotics it must 
be shown that defendant had either physical or constructive 
possession, and that he was aware that the substance of which 
he had possession was a narcotic. 
[4] Id.-01fenses-Planting and Cultivating Marijuana.-Aware-
ness that the plant was a narcotic must be shown to sustain a 
conviction of planting and cultivating marijuana. 
[5] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Questions Relat-
ing to Evidence.-The admissibility of drying leaves, seeds, 
fertilizer, papers aLd lamp, found during a search of de-
fendant's quarters in a narcotics case, is a question of law 
and is properly determined by the court outside the presence 
of the jury. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Province of Court and Jury.-
The rule that the trial court initially determines the question 
of admissibility of a confession, and then instructs the jury 
to disregard the confession if they find that it was not freely 
and voluntarily made, is justified by the fact that the jury 
must necessarily be informed of the circumstances surround-
ing the confession properly to evaluate it. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 43. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Criminal Law, § 559; [3] Poisons, 
~ 92; [4] Poisons, § 9; [5,7,8] Criminal Law, § 653; [6] Criminal 
Law, § 473; [9-12, 14-16] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [13] Arrest, 
§ 12; [17] Criminal Law, § 410. 
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[7] Id.-Province of Court and Jury-Questions Relating to Evi-
dence.-The probative force of evidence obtained by search 
and seizure does not depend on whether the search was legal 
or illegal, and no purpose would be served by having the jury 
make a second determination of that issue. 
[8] Id.-Province of Court and Jury-Questions Relating to Evi-
dence.-The legality of a search or seizure will frequently de-
pend on whether the officer had reasonable cause to make an 
arrest, and since such cause is not limited to evidence that 
would be admissible at the trial of the issue of guilt, evidence 
that was otherwise inadmissible and prejudicial would fre-
quently be presented to them if the jury were required to pass 
on the legality of the search or seizure. 
[9] Searches and Seizures-As Incident to Arrest.-A search to 
recover other stolen articles is not incidental to an arrest for 
a crime involving theft, where it occurs at a distance from 
the place of arrest and is not contemporaneous therewith. 
[10] Id.-Reasonableness.-A previous search having been made 
of defendant's room at the time of his arrest on a charge of 
shoplifting, a second search made some 48 hours later had 
no reasonable relation to defendant's arrest, where it was 
made after obtaining a "rap sheet" indicating that defendant 
had previously been arrested on two occasions involving nar-
cotics, and after the contents of a bucket found on the 
premises had been analyzed and found to contain growing 
marijuana, was not made to recover other stolen articles. 
[11] Id.-Consent to Search.-One can freely consent to the 
search of his property and, having done so, any search or 
taking of evidence pursuant to his consent is not unreasonable. 
[12] Id.-Consent to Search.-Whether in a particular case an 
apparent consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in 
submission to an express or implied assertion of authority is a 
question of fact to be determined in the light of the circum-
stances. 
[13] Arrest - Without Warrant - Reasonable Cause.-Since the 
court and not the officer must make the determination whether 
the officer's belief in making an arrest without a warrant is 
based on reasonable cause, the officer must testify to the facts 
or information known to him on which his belief is based. 
U4] Searches and Seizures-Consent to Search.-Where consent 
to a search is claimed by the People, evidence must be pre-
sented that will enable the court to determine for itself 
whether consent was in fact given. 
.. 
[9] See Cal. Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.lur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 52 et seq. 
... 
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[15] Id.-Consent to Search.-When the People seek to justify a 
search on the ground that consent was given, they have the 
burden of proving consent. 
[16] Id.-Justification for Search.-Where, regardless of whether 
defendant was a tenant, servant or guest in a home, in which 
he occupied a room, thE> home owner believed that he had at 
least joint control over his quarters and the right to enter 
them, put them at the disposal of defendant's father and 
authorize a search thereof, police officers were justified in con-
cluding that such owner had the authority over his home that 
he purported to have, and there was nothing unreasonable in 
their making a search of defendant's quarters. 
[17] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Where officers have acted in good faith with the 
consent and at the request of a home owner in conducting a 
search, evidence so obtained cannot be excluded merely be-
cause the officers may have made a reasonable mistake as to 
the extent of the owner's authority. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Mateo 
County granting probation and denying a new trial. John 
P. McMurray, Judge.· Affirmed. 
Prosecution for possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11500) and for planting and cultivating marijuana (Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11530). Order denying defendant a new trial, 
affirmed. 
Dennis L. Woodman for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy At-
torney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from an order granting 
him probation and an order denying his motion for a new 
trial entered after he was found guilty by a jury of one count 
of possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500) and 
one count of planting and cultivating marijuana. (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 11530.) . 
Defendant, a 23-year-old law student, occupied a room 
with a bath in the home of Don Stevens in Menlo Park in 
exchange for doing the gardening. On Saturday evening, 
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 
et seq. 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial CounciL 
I 
) 
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February 19, 1955, he was arrested on a charge of shoplifting. 
He admitted the taking of the articles for which he had been 
arrested, but denied that he had- taken anything else. The 
interrogating officer, Inspector Kieler, testified that he re-
quested and received defendant's permission to search his 
room. That night the officer went to the Stevens residence and 
was admitted by Stevens. He made a brief search of defend· 
ant's room, found no stolen articles, and departed. On the 
following Sunday afternoon Stevens telephoned defendant's 
father in Hollywood and suggested that he come at once to 
Menlo Park. In making defendant's room tidy for defend-
ant's father to occupy, Stevens found a bucket containing 
growing plants in defendant's bathroom. He removed the 
bucket and contents to the service porch . 
. Meanwhile, the police had obtained a "rap sheet" on 
def~ndant and learned that he had been arrested and then 
released on two occasions involving narcotics. Inspector Kie-
ler returned to the Stevens residence on Monday morning, 
February 21st, and was shown the bucket by Stevens. Analysis 
proved that it contained growing marijuana. That evening 
several officers arrived at the house. They had no search 
warrant, but Stevens gave them permission to enter and 
requested that they search the entire house. Accompanied 
by Stevens and defendant's father, the officers entered and 
searched defendant's room. In one bureau drawer they found 
drying marijuana plants, marijuana seeds, and fertilizer. 
They found more seeds in another drawer and more fertilizer 
and paper used to roll cigarettes in a desk, and a heat lamp 
in the clothes closet. 
[1] Before the trial defendant made a motion for the 
appointment of a narcotics expert to be paid by the county. 
He contends that the denial of this motion on the ground 
that he was able to pay for his own expert was error. He 
argues that since the court had previously appointed counsel, 
the question of his ability to pay for any assistance was res 
judicata, and that the only question for determination on 
the motion was the amount to be authorized for "necessary 
expenses."1 Defendant, however, was out on bail and able 
to work. A period of more than a month remained before 
'Defendant invoked section 987a of the Penal Code in support of ilis 
motion. That section reads: II In any case in which counsel is assigned 
in the superior court to defend a person who is charged therein with a 
crime, . . . such counsel . . • shall receive a reasonable sum for com-
pensation and for necessary expenses, the amount of which shall be 
determined by the court." (Italics added.) 
.. ) 
... 
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trial in which he might earn $50, the estimated fee of the 
expert. Under such circumstances the motion was properly 
denied. [2] Moreover, section 1871 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides: "Whenever it shall be made to appear 
to. any court . . . that expert evidence is, or will be required 
. . . such court . . . may . . . appoint one or more experts 
to investigate and testify at the trial. . . ." The appointment 
of experts under this section rests in the discretion of the 
court (People v. McOracken, 39 Ca1.2d 336, 350 [246 P.2d 
913] ; People v. Rickson, 112 Cal.App.2d 475, 479 [246 P.2d 
700], and cases cited therein), and no abuse of discretion has 
been shown here. Defendant did not advise the court as to 
the type of expert that was required or what he might produce. 
Furthermore, he had full opportunity to cross-examine the 
state's experts, and he produced an expert botanist of his 
own. 
At the trial defendant testified that he found the bucket 
containing the plants in Stevens' backyard, that the plants 
looked as if they were dying, that he thought they belonged 
to Stevens and since Stevens was not home, he had brought 
them inside to care for them. He denied any knowledge of 
the nature of the plants. [3] "In order to sustain a con-
viction of possession of narcotics it must be shown that the 
defendant had either physical or constructive possession, and 
that he was aware that the substance of which he had posses-
sion was a narcotic." (People v. Oandiotto, 128 Cal.App.2d 
347, 352 [275 P.2d 500], quoting from People v. Walker, 121 
Cal.App.2d 173, 174 [262 P.2d 640].) [4] Awareness that 
the plant was a narcotic must likewise be shown to sustain 
a conviction of planting and cultivating marijuana. The 
drying leaves, seeds, fertilizer, papers, and lamp, found 
during the search of defendant's quarters, were admitted 
into evidence over his objection that they had been illegally 
seized. Since that evidence played a substantial part in 
establishing defendant's knowledge of the nature of the 
growing plants, the controlling question in this case is 
whether it was legally obtained. 
[5] Defendant contends preliminarily that the trial court 
erred in determining the question of the admissibility of this 
evidence outside the presence of the jury and in not sub-
mitting it to them. The procedure adopted by the trial court 
was proper, for the admissibility of the evidence presented a 
question of law for the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2102 ; 
Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 [45 S.Ct. 417, 69 
L.Ed. 761] ; Boyer v. United States, 92 F.2d 857, 858; Marsh 
! 
J 
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v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 173; United States v. Jankowski, 
28 F.2d 800, 802; Pritchett v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 67 [143 
P.2d 622, 624-626] ; State v. Wills, 91 W.Va. 659 [114 S.E. 
261, 266, 24 A.L.R. 1398] ; contra, Compton v. State, 148 Tex. 
Crim. 204 [186 S.W.2d 74, 76].) [6] Defendant urges, 
however, that the same procedure should be followed as in 
the case of a confession, where the trial court initially deter-
mines the question of admissibility and then instructs the jury 
to disregard the confession if they find that it was not freely 
and voluntarily made. The rule of the confession cases 
is justified by the fact that the jury must necessarily be 
informed of the circumstances surrounding the confession 
properly to evaluate it. [7] The probative value of evi-
dence obtained by a search or seizure, however, does not 
depend on whether the search or seizure was legal or illegal. 
and no purpose would be served by having the jury make a 
second determination of that issue. [8] Moreover, the legal-
ity of a search or seizure will frequently depend on whether 
the officer had reasonable cause to make an arrest, and since 
such cause is not limited to evidence that would be admissible 
at the trial of the issue of guilt (People v. Boyles, ante, 
P. 652 [290 P.2d 535], and cases cited), evidence that was 
otherwise inadmissible and prejudicial would frequently be 
presented to them if the jury were required to pass on the 
legality of the search or seizure. 
[9] The attorney general contends that it is not un-
reasonable to search a man's dwelling after having arrested 
him some other place for a crime involving theft. Even if 
the object of the search was to recover other stolen articles, 
it was not incidental to the arrest, for it was at a distance 
from the place thereof and was not contemporaneous there-
with. (Agnello v. Tlnited States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 31 [46 RCt. 
4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409]; People v. Conway, 225 
Mich. 152 [195 N.W. 679, 680]; Fowler v. State, 114 
Tex.Crim. 69 [22 S.W.2d 935, 936]; ct. 5 Salsbury's 
Statutes of England [2d ed.] 744, 1070.) [10] Further-
more, in this case a previous search had already been made, 
and the second search was made some 48 hours after the 
arrest, after the "rap sheet" had been obtained, and after 
the contents of the bucket found on the service porch had 
been analyzed. The conclusion is inescapable that the second 
search was not made to recover other stolen articles, and that 
it had no reasonable relation to defendant's arrest. (Elliott 
v. State, 173 Tenn. 203 [116 S.W.2d 1009, 1012, 1013].) 
) 
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Defendant's main contention is that he did not consent 
to the search of his room. [11] One can, of course, freely 
consent to the search of his property, and having done so, 
I I any search or taking of evidence pursuant to his consent 
is • not unreasonable. [Citations.] [12] Whether in a 
particular case an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily 
given or was in submission to an express or implied assertion 
of authority is a question of fact to be determined in the 
light of all the circumstances." (People v. Michael, ante, p. 
751 [290 P.2d 852].)2 [13] We said in People v. Boyles, 
supra, ante, p. 652 [290 P.2d 535], in reference to an 
arrest without a warrant, that I' [s] ince the court and not 
the officer must make the determination whether the officer's 
belief is based upon reasonable cause, the officer must testify 
to the facts or information known to him on which his belief 
is based." [14] Similarly, where consent to search is claimed 
by the People, evidence must be presented that will enable 
the court to determine for itself whether consent was in fact 
given. [15] When the People seek to justify a search on 
the ground that consent thereto was given, they have the 
burden of proving consent. (United States v. Reckis, 119 F. 
Supp. 687, 694; Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651; 
Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654, 656; United States v. 
Slusser, 270 F. 818, 819; United States v. Novero, 58 F.Supp. 
275, 281.) The only evidence presented by the People bear-
ing on the issue of consent was the testimony of Inspector 
Kieler that he had defendant's permission to search his room, 
but under the facts and circumstances related therein,s it is 
doubtful whether the officer was justified in concluding that 
• A circumstance of particular significance is a defendant's custody 
at the time of the request for his permission to search, for where he 
has submitted to arrest, or is in jail, he knows that he is virtually power· 
less to prevent the search. (United States v. Alberti, 120 F.Supp. 171. 
174; United States v. Reckis, 119 F.Supp. 687, 694.) 
'On direct examination Inspector Kieler testified that after he had 
taken defendant to jail he secured his permission to search his room. On 
cross-examination he was asked to relate what defendant said when 
asked whether he was willing to have the officers search his room for 
other articles that might have been stolen. He answered: 
'I Well, I don't know word for word, but I do know that he definitely 
did not object. He said yes. that I have his permission to go in and 
search. 
"Did he use those words, I Yes, you have my permission" 
"I wouldn't say he did, no. I don't know what his words were, but 
I do know I was given his permission at that time. 
e 'In other words, the gist of your testimony is that you concluded, 
as a result of what he said, that you had permission, is that correct! 
"That is true. 
e 'But you cannot tell this court exactly what was said so the court 
\ j 
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defendant had freely consented to the search of his room 
or whether such consent, if given, included consent to repeated 
searches or was limited to the first search for other stolen 
articles. Thus, if that issue were crucial it is doubtful whether 
the People sustained their burden of proving that defendant 
freely consented to the searches of his room. We have con-
cluded, however, that under the facts of this case his consent 
was not necessary. 
[16] Defendant was living in the Stevens home, and it 
is clear that whether he was in fact a tenant, servant, or guest, 
Stevens believed that he had at least joint control over his 
quarters and the right to enter them, put them at the disposal 
of defendant's father, and authorize a search thereof. Under 
these circumstances the officers were justified in concluding 
that Stevens had the authority over his home that he pur-
ported to have, and there was nothing unreasonable in their 
acting accordingly. In this proceeding we are not concerned 
with enforcing defendant's rights under the law of trespass 
and landlord and tenant, but with discouraging unreasonable 
activity on the part of law enforcement officers. [17] "A 
criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the Gov-
ernment may be checkmated and the game lost merely because 
its officers have not played according to rule. I, (Mr .• Justice 
Stone in McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 [47 8.Ct. 
259, 71 L.Ed. 556]), and when as in this case the officers have 
acted in good faith with the consent and at the request of a 
home owner in conducting a search, evidence so obtained 
cannot be excluded merely because the officers may have made 
a reasonable mistake as to the extent of the owner's authority. 
(See People v. Oahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434, 442 [282 P.2d 905], 
footnote.) 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J. pro tern.,· concurred. 
can determine for itself whether you had or had not been granted per-
mission. is that also correcU 
" Not word for word, no, I can't." 
Defendant testified as follows as to what he said: "Well, the Inspector 
asked me if I objected to his going out to the house, and I said t9at I 
didn't think there was much way I could object." On cross-examination 
defendant testified, "1 said, 'I don't see bow I can object,' seeing as 
be called up Don Stevens and said he would be out, that he would be 
coming out." The court then ruled "At this time I am going to allow 
the evidence. The objection will be overruled." 
• Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Council. 
